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This paper considers the kinds of AI systems we
want involved in art and art practice. We explore
this relationship from three perspectives: as artists
interested in expanding and developing our own
creative practice; as AI researchers interested in
building new AI systems that contribute to the un-
derstanding and development of art and art prac-
tice; and as audience members interested in experi-
encing art. We examine the nature of both art prac-
tice and experiencing art to ask how AI can con-
tribute. To do so, we review the history of work
in intelligent agents which broadly speaking sits
in two camps: autonomous agents (systems that
can exhibit intelligent behaviour independently) in
one, and multi-agent systems (systems which inter-
act with other systems in communities of agents)
in the other. In this context we consider the nature
of the relationship between AI and Art and intro-
duce two opposing concepts: that of “Heroic AI”,
to describe the situation where the software takes
on the role of the lone creative hero and “Collabora-
tive AI” where the system supports, challenges and
provokes the creative activity of humans. We then
set out what we believe are the main challenges for
AI research in understanding its potential relation-
ship to art and art practice.
1 Introduction
This paper sets out to specifically address the theme of this
special track by considering the possible relationships be-
tween AI and the Arts. We will consider three related ques-
tions.
1. What kinds of systems should we as AI researchers in-
terested in supporting and understanding art practice be
designing?
2. What kind of AI systems should we as artists and musi-
cians want in order to challenge, explore and expand our
own creative practice?
3. What kinds of AI involvement in the process of produc-
ing art would satisfy current or new audiences?
In a general sense, AI research attempts to design, build
and understand computational systems that undertake activ-
ities which are normally thought to require human intelli-
gence. In a similarly general sense, “Art” can be defined as
the application of human skill and imagination to produce
work that has beauty or emotional power [def, 2015]. Us-
ing these descriptions, exploring the relationship between AI
and Art would seem to present us with at least two high-level
objectives described below.
1. Does considering art and art practice as a specific aspect
of human intelligence help us drive AI forward as a dis-
cipline?
2. How can AI assist in the application of “human skill and
imagination”, and in the production of objects of “beauty
and emotional power”?
In this paper we set out to explore the relationship between
AI, Art and Art Practice that can help guide AI research in the
future. We do this by considering this relationship from three
different viewpoints: (i) as artists interested in the possibility
of using AI systems to produce art, (ii) as AI researchers in-
terested in developing novel AI systems that can be used in
the practice of producing art, and (iii) as potential audiences
for art produced (partly or fully) using AI.
This leads us to the following three broad sets of questions:
• As artists. What kinds of AI systems do artists and
musicians want to use in their art making? How might
artists want to interact with AI systems? How much au-
tonomy would artists want to defer to an AI system in
the production of art? Would artists be happy to set up
autonomous AI systems that would then go on to cre-
ate art on behalf of the artist? And to do so repeatedly
without further intervention? Can we envisage artists
wanting to bestow a sense of creativity on the AI system
itself? Is there a greater opportunity for artists to reflect
on and develop their own creative practice through in-
teraction with AI systems? How might AI systems best
challenge, provoke, and stimulate artists in the future?
• As researchers. On what kinds of systems and tech-
niques should we in the AI community be focussing our
efforts? What can we learn about both the potential and
limitations of AI when trying trying to build systems that
can produce artefacts that if produced by humans might
be considered art? How can we build systems that en-
able artists to invest human artistic sensibilities into al-
gorithms so that the outputs of the system have the qual-
ities of art and that reflect us as artists in style, aesthetic
or process? How does thinking specifically about art,
rather than other aspects of intelligence, drive AI for-
ward as a discipline?
• As audiences. Can we envisage scenarios where audi-
ences would sustain interest in art produced solely by an
autonomous AI system? What kinds of evolving arte-
facts might sustain our interest for an extended period
of time? What kinds of involvement by AI in art prac-
tice would audiences be interested in understanding or
knowing more about? Could audiences become inter-
ested in the process of an artist interacting with AI sys-
tems to produce art? What are the new opportunities for
revealing the nature of artistic process itself through in-
teracting with AI systems? And could that revelation be
used to heighten the audience experience of art?
In order to consider these three different perspectives we
introduce two distinct views on the role of AI systems in pro-
ducing art. This distinction will help us answer these differ-
ent sets of questions, and identify the range of potential AI
interventions or collaborations in art. We label these different
approaches to design and intention in AI systems as Heroic
AI and Collaborative AI.
The first approach, Heroic AI, can be summarised as sys-
tems designed to produce art autonomously without the di-
rect intervention of the artist or programmer. In instances
where the software is written by a researcher or programmer,
no artist may be involved at all. In recent years, a signifi-
cant amount of AI research has been undertaken to develop
such systems where the software assumes the role of a lone
“creative hero”. We introduce the term “heroic” to empha-
sise the intended or implicit role of such systems (and their
creators) being close to that of the heroic artist who struggles
(often in adversity) to create great works of art. The kinds
of challenges here are often described in terms of producing
novelty or value, or in producing objects that if they had been
created by humans would have been described as art. Whilst
there have been notable successes, researchers remain fixated
on the challenge of such systems creating artefacts that can
sustain the interest or engagement of human audiences.
The second approach, Collaborative AI, encompases those
systems designed to augment or support the individual or
collective practice of human artists. The challenges here
are understanding issues such as interaction, flow and feed-
back [Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Jones et al., 2009] when work-
ing with technology. For example, how can an artist interact
with a system so that they can offer the kinds of feedback and
sense of collaboration that occurs when working with human
collaborators? In general, can we build systems that can pos-
itively influence the artist’s approach as the work progresses,
without “getting in the way”?
We will next explore these classes in the context of artistic
AI system in more detail.
2 Heroic AI
When Deep Blue beat world champion chess grandmaster
Gary Kasparov in 1997, many saw it as a turning point for
both AI and human intelligence [Campbell et al., 2002]. In
the years prior, most scoffed at the idea of a computer playing
at even the level of an average human player. But incremen-
tal improvements to chess-playing algorithms gradually de-
livered breakthroughs, leading eventually to the bettering of
the best human player. And if a machine could beat the best
human chess player, the implication was that it could better
the best humans in other activities that require intelligence as
well.
Today, any number of computer chess playing programs
are regularly able to beat almost any human player and beat-
ing a grandmaster does not make front page news. Learn-
ing and playing chess has certainly been enhanced by AI, yet
watching two chess playing programs battle each other isn’t
interesting to the public. Nor is there huge interest in watch-
ing humans play against computers. Why? Because chess is
much more than just the description of chess encapsulated by
the computer.
Undoubtedly, if researchers did develop an “autonomous
computer artist” that could produce work comparable with
the best human art, it would be an extraordinary achievement.
The researchers would be lauded as AI heroes for an amazing
breakthrough. Others would no doubt lament that perhaps
the last bastion of what is uniquely human had finally been
toppled by a machine, albeit one designed by humans. But
after this celebration and lament, how differently would we
really view human creativity? Perhaps one way to identify
what we mean by human creativity is precisely that which
automation cannot do, so whenever AI systems improve it
shifts our interpretation to whatever is not currently possible
by machine.
While trying to create a machine that makes art as com-
petently as the best human artists is a goal which is likely to
move forward the discipline of AI, perhaps the greater chal-
lenge is to consider how it changes our view of art and art
practice as artists and audiences. Unlike chess, art is not a
fixed game with a formal set of rules and defined outcome.
Art evolves and changes with culture, it is a complex system
of social dialogues and inter-relationships between people,
objects and environments. That environment includes techno-
science (and AI technoscience) which continues to have im-
portant impacts on art itself.
It is relevant here to consider how we assign little value to
what we might call “art” made by other species, except per-
haps for its immediate novelty. While “elephant art” or “pri-
mate art” occasionally piques our interest, clearly the value
we assign to it does not approach that of human art (we don’t
build museums for animal art, for example) [Weesatchanam,
2006]. Could we ever imagine a gallery of “autonomous com-
puter art” sustained by public or private funding? Even for
our own species, children’s art is not valued in the same way
as that of adult artists. We might expect an even more diffi-
cult situation for “heroic computer artists” because they are
not even mammals.
Heroic AI attends on an anthropocentric creativity, one
where the software or system is conceptualised as the lone
“hero”, a personification of certain romantic and Byronic no-
tions of art and artists that find their origins in 19th century
Romanticism [Cookson, 1937]. With AI on an heroic mis-
sion to bring a new form of creativity into the world, this
tradition is renewed, albeit with a new context and a greater
ironic twist. Heroic AI systems focus on a fixed notion of
what their creators believe to be art and creativity, one that
privileges the aesthetic art object. The real hero is the pro-
grammer, not the software or the artefacts it produces. It is
not surprising that competent technical researchers are often
drawn to Heroic AI, because it is seen as a grand technical
challenge.
In reality, art is a continuing process of negotiation. It can
ignite the broadest palette of human emotion and motivation:
joy, sadness, excitement, discomfort, reflection, disgust, won-
derment, pleasure, despair, collaboration and action. Art re-
flects something of what it is to be alive and to be able to com-
municate this shared experience with others. Philosophers
such as O’Hear dismiss the idea of machines originating art
entirely, because art “in the full sense is based in human ex-
perience” and requires a communication between artist and
audience drawn from that shared experience [O’Hear, 1995].
Any “communication” of human experience by machine can
only be parasitically meaningful, being a pastiche of real hu-
man creativity.
However, any concerns we have to the Heroic AI approach
are not due to objections such as those of O’Hear (one can
at least imagine the possibility of having some meaningful
communication with prior hominoid species or alien intelli-
gences for example). Nor do past concerns of AI (issues of
embodiment, turing completeness, symbol grounding, etc.)
determine our position. We see no in-principle reason to rule
out the possibility of Heroic AI being able to create outputs
that meet or exceed human capabilities, even without “being
human” in any sense.
Our main concern of Heroic AI approaches is an inability
to consider wider social and cultural context in which we ex-
perience art. Even if computers could offer something new
or different to art, could it ever be properly valued in a social
context? Being an artist, making art – is a choice. The fact
that human artists intentionally set out to make work, and un-
derwent a process to do so, is an important aspect of the way
in which we engage with art. A computer or machine pro-
grammed to make art cannot make that choice.1 It might be
argued that biology has “programmed” us to make art, just as
the male Bower bird is genetically disposed to constructing
a beautiful nest to attract a mate. But becoming a practicing
artist and understanding the social context of art is more nu-
anced than a binary decision or even a genetic predisposition.
2.1 Automating the creative process
Thinking about creative activity more generally, we should be
concerned when technology assumes the main creative role
and limits the potential for human creative expression. Criti-
cisms of the automation of creativity are not new and we dis-
1Programming the machine to make this choice does not circum-
vent the fundamental problem either.
cussed them elsewhere [McCormack and d’Inverno, 2012b],
highlighting automation’s reductive effects on personal cre-
ative development. Deferring creativity to a machine encour-
ages a creative lethargy on behalf of human users. In cur-
rent incarnations (e.g. Camera smile detection, “retro” image
filters, or “Content-aware” filters) automating creativity ho-
mogenises the creative artefact to a singular concept of value.
A primary impetus for machine automation is timesaving:
by freeing us from tedious or repetitive task we will have
more “spare” time (for leisure, for example). Despite increas-
ing automation in many aspects of working life, the average
time spent at work in developed countries has not changed
significantly in the last fifty years [Gershuny et al., 2003].
Yet many people report subjective time-shortening, or “time-
famine” effects brought about by the always-on, networked
society and often blame this “famine” on technology [Wajc-
man, 2015].2
3 Collaborative AI
We take Collaborative AI as research which is concerned with
designing AI systems that provoke, challenge and support
human art practice. As AI researchers we are interested in
building such systems because AI has much more to offer
art than attempts at mimicking the creative process itself. A
wide range of AI research opportunity opens up if we set our-
selves the challenge of building computers that can become
our creative partner or where new forms of creative activity
are developed by meaningful collaboration between human
artist and machine agent.
Artists often require reflection, feedback, reminding, con-
nections, stimulation and interaction; all of which can poten-
tially be offered by AI systems. Artists need sources of new
ideas, feedback on ongoing ideas, as well as a sense of one’s
own creative practice. AI systems can help the artist develop
a greater understanding of their creative process and how they
work best with others. Collaborative AI improves everyone’s
creative activity, empowering people to be at their creative
best. This potential seems a much more worthwhile goal than
that of the Heroic AI approach and opens up clear avenues for
AI research.
One important example is the Flow Machines project [Ghe-
dini et al., 2013], which specifically asks the question: “Can
machines make us more creative?”. This research is inspired
by the insight that the future of content generation is in our-
selves [Pachet, 2008] and that we can use AI technology to
bring out the best in ourselves, being better than we could
ever be without it.
In other words the idea is one of building Collaborative AI
agents that can help us develop our own artistic and musi-
cal practice. One example of such a system is known as the
Reflexive Looper [Pachet et al., 2013] which is shown in Fig-
ure 1. In this system a pianist or guitarist plays in a whole
range of different patterns but over a specific known chord
sequence such as that of a standard. The system then starts
to “jam” with the musician, deciding what parts of the in-
put source material to use to perform in response to the live
2Although such effects are not uniformly accepted.
musician. In this way a solo guitarist or pianist can start to
collaborate with the agent looper.
Figure 1: The Reflexive Looper in Action. The guitars first
plays a bass line over a chord sequence from a jazz standard.
In this case the Miles Davis Tune “Solar”. The guitarist in-
puts chord shapes as the looper plays back a bass line. Even-
tually the looper has enough material that the musician can
start to play with several copies of himself.
The looper can take on one, two or more instantiations of a
guitarist (for example) playing a bass line, a chord line and a
solo, with each of these instantiations responding to the live
guitarist. So the system shares the goal of creating great mu-
sic, and it has the goal of trying to respond to the live guitarist
in order to create the best “ensemble” sound possible.
The musician’s creativity is challenged and stimulated by
playing with responsive copies of themselves. Sometimes
they come up with fantastic musical creations that would not
have been possible with the musician playing alone without
the looper. However, this works because the agent looper is
not expected or desired to be autonomous in any way. It does
not have any of its own motivations and musical intentions.
Instead it is designed to serve the musical goals and moti-
vations of the autonomous musician. Of course the looper
could be programmed to be more autonomous, to have its
own sounds, its own performance ideas but it would not then
be able to collaborate with a human user in such a successful
way.
In summary, we see Art as a social enterprise that encom-
passes human communication and experience. Imitations or
parodies only lessen the human condition (consider a film
such as The Truman Show for example). Collaborative AI
on the other hand, presents a broad set of possibilities for AI
and Art, including expanding the creative activity of every-
one. In order to distinguish these different types of system
within a traditional AI framework we next look at the con-
cepts of agency and autonomy that have been present in AI
for several decades. Understanding these concepts will be
crucial to exploring Collaborative AI relationships from the
perspective of artist, researcher and audience, that we will
explore in the final part of the paper.
4 Revisiting Agency and Autonomy
Here we revisit notions of agency and autonomy in order to
ground our ideas in mainstream AI resaerch. There are es-
sentially two main streams of agent work over the last 30
years: autonomous agent architectures and multi-agent sys-
tems. These are the direct pre-cursors to our heroic and col-
laborative agents in art.
AI has its origins in the ambitious idea of building a sin-
gle intelligent autonomous agent that equalled or bettered hu-
man intelligence. Systems such as PRS [d’Inverno et al.,
2004], Soar [Li and Laird, 2014] and Cyc [Lenat and Guha,
1993] are typical examples from the early days of AI that
tried to achieve this goal. Applying this classification to art-
producing systems we would see these agents as heroic lone
artists capable of independently producing a series of art-
works over a sustained period.
As opposed to single-agent architectures the other focus
of research has been into multi-agent systems. Research has
addressed issues of interaction, communication, negotiation
and collaboration [d’Inverno et al., 2012]. Extending this to
the world of art, this approach is about building systems that
could collaborate with other agents (typically human) in order
to produce work that the human would not be able to do (or
not so easily) without this relationship.
From the paintbrush to the piano, artists have always used
tools (or “agents”) to create their art and AI offers a whole
new range of interactions that are possible because of com-
puting. Systems that can respond to ongoing creative acts in
an artistic process can propose alternatives, can put together
previous content in new ways and can provide feedback or
analysis of our ongoing work and so reshape our activity –
even as we are undertaking it. Thus AI systems can provide a
much wider range of collaborative possibilities because of the
analytical, generative and adaptive features of such systems.
They offer new creative routes based on a dynamic aware-
ness of context and past history. Computational systems can
give us a much wider palette of opportunity than traditional
non-digital tools for making art and in order to understand
this relationship more clearly we next identify the distinction
between agency and autonomy.
4.1 Distinguishing Agency and Autonomy
The SMART Agent Framework [Luck and d’Inverno, 1995]
was the first attempt to define agency and autonomy in com-
putational systems and explicate the distinction and relation-
ship between them. We summarise the model briefly here by
outlining only the basic components informally (Figure 2).
Attributes are the fundamental component and represent
anything that can be perceived. An environment consists of
a set of attributes. Some of these attributes can be grouped
together to from entities. Entities therefore also comprise a
set of attributes that can be perceived as a whole (such as a
tree) by others. Objects are then special kinds entities that
have the ability to change the state of the environment. Ob-
jects can include a paint brush because it has the ability to
place paint on a piece of paper for example.
Any object can be considered as an Agent as long as it is
serving a purpose for another agent. In other words, that the
agent is serving a goal where a goal is some description of
the state in the environment. (“brush is clean”, “brush has red
paint”, “room is dry”, and so on, are examples of goals that
could be ascribed to a paint brush). In this model, the paint-
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Figure 2: The SMART Framework for Agency and Auton-
omy. The environment consists of attributes which can be
perceived. Some of these attributes may be grouped together
into entities. Entities that have the ability to change the en-
vironment by adding and removing attributes through actions
are called objects. Those objects which are serving a purpose
in the world are called agents. And those agents who do not
rely on other agents for purposeful behaviour and can gener-
ate their own goals through higher-level intrinsic motivations
are autonomous agents.
brush is seen as an agent whilst it is serving the goal of the
artist using it to produce an artwork. The fact that the paint-
brush is serving the goals of the artist sets up an important
social relationship (if anyone else tried to remove the paint-
brush whilst it was serving as an agent for the artist then it
would clearly be met with resistance). However, as soon as
the paintbrush is discarded by the artist as no longer being
useful, then the agency of the paintbrush is lost and reverts to
being an object.
Here the paintbrush is heavily reliant on the goals of others
to become an agent because it cannot create its own goals.
It therefore requires more complex agents (an elephant, a hu-
man, or even perhaps an AI system) in order for those goals to
be generated and then given to it. This facilitated the descrip-
tion of autonomy – or autonomous agents – to be defined as
those entities that could create their own goals. Such agents
did not rely on other agents for their own self-determined pur-
poseful existence. Clearly a paintbrush cannot create it’s own
goals, but elephants and humans can. This led to the def-
inition of intrinsic higher-level motivations – which did not
relate to descriptions of the world-like goals – to define au-
tonomous agents. So, from the perspective of the artist, the
researcher and the audience, what do the issues become about
the relationship between agency and autonomy? This we con-
sider in the next section.
5 How much Autonomy do we want in
Collaborative AI?
We explore this from the point of view of our three different
perspectives.
As Artists. How much autonomy would we actually want to
give to a machine about the artistic choices that are made in
any process? Harold Cohen – an artist who decided to use
technology to build his own AI system called AARON [Sun-
dararajan, 2014] – is happy to speak informally of AARON
in the sense of having its own intrinsic motivations and in the
way it approaches a new piece of work. And once the sys-
tem starts to create an image there is no intervention from a
human until that image has been created. So in one sense the
system is autonomous in its action but on the other hand the
system is clearly vehicle for the artistic motivations of Cohen,
an established and successful artist. It would be very hard in
the goal/motivation model of agency and autonomy to think
of the system as having its own artistic motivations.
It is worth pointing out that though every output is differ-
ent, Cohen is always re-coding the system to produce new
kinds of behaviours and aesthetics. He also heavily edits the
voluminous output down to only what he considers the very
best works. This is not the autonomous journey of a human
artist, but a new set of criteria that come from the autonomous
human artists that essentially instantiates a new kind of agent
each time the code is edited. Indeed, as artists it is almost im-
possible to conceive of a situation where we would have any
need for a Heroic AI system generating its own goals from its
higher-level motivations. The system will always embody the
goals of the artist, just as Damien Hirst’s team of autonomous
human workers will always embody his.
What about if we think of the system not as an artist in
its own right but as a potential collaborator? Many of us
have shared the joy of collaborating and it will often stretch
and challenge us in ways that would not have been possible
through a lone artistic journey. The Lennon in all of us wants
a McCartney for collaboration. Even when we think of the
system as a collaborator the question is still how much au-
tonomy do we want in a computational collaborator? Do we
want it to have its own artistic goals and sensitivities that may
be quite different from our own? Would we really respect the
artistic sensitivities and motivations of the system sufficiently
that and see them as an equal in the same way that Lennon
and McCartney clearly saw each other?
What we suspect here is that artists would be keen to col-
laborate with AI systems as long as it was clear that the col-
laboration in the end was simply about serving the goals of
the artists. We want systems with sufficient agency to pro-
voke, challenge and collaborate but in such a way that all of
the artistic motivations, artistic choices and sensitivities be-
longed to us the artists. Again there is no sense that the artifi-
cial collaborator would rely entirely on itself for a purposeful
existence. We would see it as an agent whose goal was to
serve the artistic ambitions of the artist. This is not to say
of course that designing such systems is any easier or harder
than Heroic AI architectures: only that the ambition underly-
ing the design of the different classes are quite different.
As Researchers. It is clearly an attractive and seductive goal
to produce a system capable of producing work that – if pro-
duced by a human – could or would be seen as “art”. This em-
bodies and refreshes the original exciting ideas of artificial in-
telligence as set out by McCarthy and friends in the 1950s, but
now the focus is on “human creativity” as opposed to “human
intelligence”. This has been a successful field of AI in the last
10 years thanks to the efforts of a handful of key researchers
in the field of computational creativity [Boden, 1994; 2009;
Colton, 2012; Colton et al., 2009; Cardoso et al., 2009;
Wiggins, 2003; 2006]. There has been much media, press,
TV, grant-funding opportunities related to the development
of AI activity opening up all kinds of debates about the na-
ture of creativity and the nature of art. Examples include the
BBC’s “Can a computer write Shakespeare” [bbc, 2014] and
another the Wired article: “Artificial artists: when computers
become creative” [wir, 2013].
What is interesting about this work are the related goals
that underpin their design. Is it a demonstration of what is
possible by bringing together a range of different techniques
from AI and showing how different aesthetic and stylistic
concerns can be embodied in algorithms? Or is the goal to
design a system to autonomously build music, text or im-
ages? Or lastly, is the goal to develop notions of individual
creativity which challenge the idea that only humans can be
creative?
Despite this initial success, the challenge of building a
Heroic AI design that will sustain interest to audiences now
seems harder than it did even a few years ago. On the other
hand, there will always be a desire from artists and creatives
to use Collaborative AI systems that can stimulate and pro-
mote creative activity. Systems that we can collaborate with
to extend our own creative activity, that can remind us of past
processes, approaches or outputs at the right moment, could
sustain and develop our own creative practice . In this view
we can be clear that the motivations driving the artistic pro-
cess belong solely to that artist and there is no claim from
anyone that the artificial system plays an equal or greater role.
As Audiences. Does art exist without an audience that is will-
ing to experience it as art? One of the fascinating things about
the experience of art is to unpick the emotional, motivational
and cognitive state that the artist was in when they were pro-
ducing the art in question. Art leaves traces of that. Even
if we could create an AI system with motivations including
a desire to please, a desire to be respected, a desire to mate,
desire to keep learning to a be better at something and so on
– would we really ever be that interested in the output? There
is also the question of social, political, economic contexts as
well as the personal and emotional ones. Could an audience
empathise with the plight of the AI system? Would they be
open to understanding the nature of the process? The process
of the algorithm and the challenges that were met when try-
ing to build the system and to see this as an important part of
appreciation the final output as art?
We can imagine various Turning-type tests where an au-
dience is made to believe that the performer or artists is hu-
man. But that simply tells us more about how technology is
improving and what is possible functionally. It tells us little
about the human condition in the way allows us to explore
what it is to be human. No doubt software systems can do
wonderful things too, but can we ever be interested in the
outputs of these systems as art if we can’t relate it to under-
standing the programer as an artist themselves?
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to set out how AI can play a part
in art and art practice by categorising effort into two distinct
camps. In the blue corner we have the autonomous AI agent
as the heroic artist, an autonomous intelligent creative sys-
tem with its own sense of aesthetics able to make its own
artists choices and produce works of “art”. In the red corner
we have the collaborative computational system as an agent
of the artist. Helping the artist move through the myriad of
imaginative, artistic, evaluative, and editorial choices that un-
fold in every moment.
We have tried to set out what research questions the Heroic
AI approach could be addressing by considering the perspec-
tive of artist, audience and researcher. We have argued that
a stronger and more coherent focus comes from a Collabora-
tive AI approach, which aims to build systems that give hu-
man artists new modes of artistic activity, interacting in ways
not available through non-digital tools such as paintbrushes
and pianos. In this way AI can be driven by the demands of
artists who are open to working in new ways, and this focus
can enliven and challenge AI as a research discipline.
One might think of this as the “participatory design of AI
research” where the needs and desires of artists help map out
clear avenues of AI research.
Art and Music are currently evaluated in the context of hu-
man experience and the effect they leave on their audience.
Art broadens and expands the human condition like no other
human activity, so being able to assist humans in continuing
this creative journey through Collaborative AI is a challeng-
ing and credible goal for AI and the benefit of humanity. And
whilst AI can enrich the creative process of artists, the field
of AI as a research discipline can itself be enriched by the
ongoing challenges that artists bring to the table.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the biggest recent suc-
cesses of AI have not been in heroic anthropomorphic intel-
ligences. Rather, this has occurred in our networked soci-
ety, bringing an era of “big data” and “deep learning”, where
global mediated social interactions provide the empirical data
for machine prediction. Largely in the service of corporate or
government knowledge wealth, these systems consider hu-
mans from the perspective of data points clustered on a land-
scape. This approach is more about prediction or classifica-
tion than supporting creative activity and is most commonly
used for marketing purposes. What the long term repercus-
sions of this “datafication” of human desire and creativity are
remains an open question. Collaborative AI presents a won-
derful opportunity to develop AI research to enable, support
and enhance social human creative activity.
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